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Abstract 
There has been extensive research examining the link between safety voicing behaviours and 
safety outcomes in the workplace. However, very little research has examined the effect that 
the severity of a safety hazard has on individuals’ voicing behaviours. Additionally, no 
known research has considered that individuals may simply be removing or fixing hazards 
instead of informing others about them. In the current study, participants completed an office 
task in an environment that contained either low-risk or high-risk safety hazards. Twenty 
seven participants completed the task in the low-risk condition and 27 the high-risk 
condition.  Twelve of the high-risk participants noticed at least one hazard, while 14 of their 
counterparts noticed at least one hazard. However, only two reported high-risk hazards and 
one participant neutralised a high-risk hazard. Additionally, only two participants reported 
low-risk hazards and two neutralised low-risk hazards. These findings raise concerns for the 
usefulness of self-report data. Results and implications are discussed within the context of the 
strengths and limitations of the research design.  
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Introduction 
The health and safety situation around the world is abysmal. For example, it has been 
estimated that every day, more than 960,000 workers get hurt due to workplace accidents, 
and 5,330 die due to work-related diseases (Hämäläinen, Saarela, & Takala, 2009). 
Unfortunately, the situation is no different in first-world countries, including New Zealand, as 
evidenced by the Pike River disaster in 2010 and other serious workplace incidents 
throughout the country. For example, in 2014, 3,503 workers were seriously injured and 34 
workers died due to workplace incidents (WorkSafe New Zealand, 2015a; WorkSafe New 
Zealand, 2015b). Also, in 2013, 182,900 claims were made to ACC for work-related injuries, 
of which 378 were cases of serious injury (MacPherson, 2014). While this is a small 
percentage of serious injuries, even minor injuries result in employee suffering, and lost 
money for ACC and the worker’s employer, so it is imperative to reduce the amount of minor 
injuries as well as serious injuries and deaths (MacPherson, 2014). According to the 
Department of Labour, work-related injury and disease has an annual cost of $3.5 billion, 
which includes costs incurred by organisations and ACC (WorkSafe New Zealand, 2012). 
These data clearly show that something needs to be done to reduce the amount of workplace 
incidents, as organisations cannot afford the costs associated with injury and/or death, and 
people should not be dying in their workplace. 
This study examines one aspect of workplace safety – individuals’ reactions to safety 
hazards. Reactions of interest included whether individuals fix or remove the hazard – 
henceforth referred to as neutralising the hazard, ignore the hazard, or tell others of the 
hazard – referred to as voicing. Reactions to six hazards, which varied in terms of 
seriousness, were examined. The rate at which participants noticed hazards was also 
recorded, as it is impossible to react to a hazard that has not been noticed. The introduction 
examines types of safety hazards and the effect they can have on the workplace. This is 
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followed by an overview of voicing research and safety research that has examined voicing in 
the context of different safety hazards. The introduction concludes with a number of 
predictions about peoples’ reactions to each level of safety hazards. 
Safety Hazards: How do they happen? 
While a workplace accident is ultimately the event which results in injury or loss of life, 
there must be a catalyst in place to cause the accident. Safety researchers have developed 
models to explain causes of accidents, with Reason’s Swiss cheese model perhaps being the 
most widely-used (Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos, 2007; Salmon, Cornelissen, & 
Trotter, 2012). This model states that accidents occur when several latent failures come into 
alignment and are accompanied by active failures, known as unsafe behaviour (Reason, 
1990). 
There are several levels of latent failures which can interact to create situations that allow 
for accidents to occur. These levels can include organisational influences, environmental, 
team, and/or individual factors. For example, in a hospital ward, the first level could include 
high workload with a handwritten prescription system instead of a computerised system 
which would reduce errors. This could interact with staffing levels and a lack of a supportive 
culture to allow for accidents if the ward becomes too busy, has a lack of supervision, or has 
inexperienced nurses. These final factors could increase the likelihood of an error occurring, 
which could result in an accident such as a patient receiving an incorrect prescription. 
However, even if a hazard is present and latent failures allow for a situation where an 
accident could occur, the accident will not happen if active failures are avoided. Ramsey’s 
Accident Sequence model describes the processes that can occur when an individual is 
exposed to a safety hazard, and how the situation can result in an incident or not (Ramsey, 
1989).  
4 
 
Ramsey’s Accident Sequence Model describes the sequence of events which can occur 
when a worker is exposed to a safety hazard (Ramsey, 1989). Ramsey’s model stipulates that 
when an individual is exposed to a safety hazard, they must first perceive the hazard, then 
recognise that the hazard poses some level of danger. Until these processes have occurred, the 
individual cannot react to the hazard, increasing the likelihood that an accident will occur. 
Once they have recognised that the hazard is dangerous, the worker can decide to avoid the 
hazard, and attempt to take action if they are capable of doing so. This action could include 
neutralising the hazard or informing someone else about the hazard, which is known as using 
their safety voice. 
Recent research has expanded upon this idea by examining the link between situational 
awareness and safety. As Sætrevik (2013) explains, situational awareness is essentially 
knowing what is occurring around you, which is extremely important in the workplace. If an 
individual has an incorrect perception of what is occurring, or simply not enough information 
of what is happening, then it is highly likely that an incident can occur as the individual will 
not know how to react appropriately (McGuinness, 2004; Sætrevik, 2013). While situational 
awareness is extremely important for maintaining safety in certain situations (for example, 
while flying an aircraft), it can also be a variable of interest when considering individual’s 
reactions to safety hazards, including reporting, neutralising, avoiding, or doing nothing 
whatsoever about a hazard. 
The commonly accepted model of situational awareness is Endsley’s hierarchical model 
which consists of three levels (Endsley, 1995; McGuinness, 2004; Sætrevik, 2013). Level one 
involves perceiving relevant factors in the environment, such as any objects or situations that 
could disrupt the individual’s task and/or cause injury (Endsley, 1995; Sætrevik, 2013). Level 
two involves compiling the information from Level one into a comprehensive view of the 
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situation, while Level three involves using information from the previous levels to predict 
what the environment will look like in the near future (Endsley, 1995; Sætrevik, 2013). 
While no known research has specifically examined the link between situational 
awareness and safety voicing, it is obvious that some degree of situational awareness must be 
required for an individual to notice a safety hazard and therefore report the hazard. As such, 
situational awareness was considered to be a potentially important control variable for this 
study. However, situational awareness is simply the first stage of what can occur when a 
worker is exposed to a safety hazard. The worker must react in some way to the safety 
hazard. This could include using their safety voice to inform someone of the hazard, 
neutralising the hazard, or avoiding the hazard. Very few studies have examined workers’ 
reactions to safety hazards, however some have looked at workers’ voicing rates compared 
across different types of hazards. 
Voicing and severity of hazards 
While many researchers have examined worker’s reasons for not informing their 
supervisor about safety hazards (refer to Pages 8-10), few have looked at the hazards 
themselves (Lu, 2014). In particular, very few researchers have examined the effect of hazard 
severity on the likelihood of workers voicing their concerns to a supervisor. Unfortunately, 
this area seems to be neglected by researchers, possibly because they believe that common 
sense would indicate that workers are more likely to report hazards that are more dangerous. 
The few studies that have examined this area seem to support this line of thinking, with 
participants indicating that they would not report trivial hazards but would report serious or 
life-threatening hazards (Evans, et al., 2006; Lawton & Parker, 2002; Lu, 2014). While these 
studies work to fill an important gap in the health and safety voicing literature, they fail to 
consider an important factor. It is possible that workers do not report trivial hazards because 
they simply neutralise them to avoid the hassle of filing report forms and to save time. 
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However, there is no known research that examines workers’ neutralising behaviours in 
regards to safety hazards, so the voicing literature will be discussed to further develop 
predictions of workers’ behaviour in response to different types of hazards. The first issue to 
discuss is: who, exactly, do workers voice to in order for it to be considered voicing? 
Who do workers voice to? 
A key question in safety research is who do workers voice (or not) safety concerns to? 
Several safety researchers have examined workers’ “voicing” or “silence” behaviours in the 
workplace (e.g.; Cortina & Magley, 2003; Dundon & Gollan, 2007). Due to the abundance of 
research in this field, some researchers use differing definitions for voicing and silence. Of 
particular importance is the distinction of who the worker reports to. Some researchers state 
that this could include supervisors, managers, co-workers, or anyone in the workplace who 
works for the same organisation (e.g. Brewster, Velez, Mennicke, & Tebbe, 2014; Dundon & 
Gollan, 2007). This line of thinking is based upon the premise that even if co-workers cannot 
neutralise a workplace issue, they may be able to assist in some way, possibly by warning 
others to stay away, by finding someone who can neutralise the danger, or by providing 
emotional support to a colleague. Additionally, if the issue could harm the co-workers 
physically, mentally, or emotionally, then they have the right to know about the issue so that 
they can take action to avoid it themselves (e.g. Brewster, et al., 2014). 
In contrast, other researchers stipulate that supervisors and managers should only be 
considered in the definition, as co-workers or subordinates may not be able to do anything 
about the workplace issue (e.g. Cortina & Magley, 2003; Lee, Heilman, & Near, 2004). This 
particular line of thought is commonly used in research that is focussed on whistle-blowing 
behaviours, for example when an individual is reporting sexual harassment in the workplace. 
In this situation, informing your manager or supervisor may be the only effective way to 
solve the issue. 
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However, to properly determine any limits for who workers voice to and how that determines 
if the behaviour is truly considered voicing behaviour, one must determine exactly how 
voicing and silence are defined – rather than relying on the varying definitions provided by 
researchers. Considering general voicing and silence research, definitions of voicing and 
silence were developed to fit the health and safety arena, with particular focus on who  
workers voice to. Additionally, the current legal situation in New Zealand was considered 
when developing these definitions, as the Health and Safety law in New Zealand is currently 
being updated. The law change states that if an employee informs their superior – who could 
be any employee that is higher in the workplace hierarchy – of a safety hazard, then the first 
individual is absolved of any blame should an incident occur (Health and Safety at Work Act, 
2015). The last person to be informed of the hazard is the individual that will be prosecuted if 
any legal action is taken (Health and Safety at Work Act, 2015). 
Therefore, the following definitions for voicing and silence were developed. Voicing is the 
act of an employee mentioning a safety issue within the workplace to their supervisor or 
manager with the intention that the issue will be neutralised or removed. Conversely, silence 
is the intentional withholding of information by an employee about a safety issue within the 
workplace. It is important to note that silence is only considered to have happened if the 
individual has noticed the hazard and decided to do nothing about it; if the employee did not 
notice the hazard, then they are not exhibiting silence. Additionally, co-workers have been 
excluded from these definitions, as there are very few situations where co-workers will be 
able to help neutralise safety hazards, and the upcoming law change does not consider co-
workers to be included in voicing behaviours (Health and Safety at Work Act, 2015). Now 
that voicing and silence have been clearly defined, possible reasons for workers not 
expressing their safety voice can be considered. 
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Why do workers voice or not? 
Due to the abundance of research on workplace voicing and silence, many different 
reasons have been found for workers not voicing safety concerns. These include 
unwillingness to strain workplace relations (e.g. Bienefeld & Grote, 2012), fear of 
punishment (e.g. Bienefeld & Grote, 2012), and perceived time pressure (e.g. Bell, Özbilgin, 
Beauregard, & Sürgevil, 2011). 
Many researchers focus on either silence or voicing when examining workers’ reasons for 
not informing others of workplace issues, however results seem to be fairly consistent across 
both fields (Klaas, Olson-Buchanan, & Ward, 2012). It is commonly accepted that workers 
consider multiple costs and benefits of voicing when deciding if they should voice; this 
process occurs every time the worker experiences an issue in the workplace (Bell, et al., 
2011; Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Cortina & Magley, 2003; Detert & Edmondson, 2011). 
While very few researchers have examined more than two reasons for silence in a single 
study, those that have explored multiple reasons found consistent results. 
For example, Bienefeld and Grote (2012) examined possible reasons for aircrew silence 
when safety issues arise on commercial airliners. Their findings indicate that operational 
pressures were a chief cause for silence among Pursers and Captains, such as conflict 
between efficiency, comfort, and safety for passengers and perceived time pressure in daily 
operations. Additionally, Bienefeld and Grote (2012) found that many airline workers would 
remain silent to avoid damaging relationships with co-workers or to avoid potential 
punishment for speaking up. Similarly, Tucker et al., (2008) found that bus drivers were more 
likely to report safety hazards if their organisation listened to, encouraged, and took action on 
safety suggestions. However, this relationship was fully mediated by co-worker support for 
workplace safety. So, if an individual’s co-workers are supportive of safety voicing, then the 
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individual is more likely to voice safety concerns to their supervisors. This is similar to 
Bienefeld and Grote’s (2012) findings with regards to workplace relationships. 
Additionally, a meta-analysis conducted by Klaas, Olson-Buchanan, and Ward (2012), 
revealed that there are several common factors that individuals consider before voicing about 
workplace issues. In particular, if the organisation is supportive of workers who inform their 
supervisors about workplace issues, then workers are more likely to voice about issues, as 
they feel comfortable that the organisation will approve of their actions (Lee, Heilmann, & 
Near, 2004; Near & Miceli, 1996). Additionally, lower risk of retaliatory action for voicing or 
whistleblowing behaviour is linked to higher rates of voicing workplace concerns (Casal & 
Bogui, 2008; Miceli & Near, 1988a; Miceli & Near, 1988b; Trevino & Victor, 1992). 
Furthermore, employees consider the effectiveness of the reporting system before voicing 
any issues. That is, if they believe their whistleblowing will be acted upon, then they are 
more likely to inform their supervisor or manager about the workplace issue, especially if 
detailed documentation is utilised to protect the individual from retaliation (Casal & Bogui, 
2008; Trevino & Victor, 1992; Victor, Trevino, & Shapiro, 1993). Any laws or organisational 
policies that protect whistle-blowers from retaliation also increase the likelihood of 
individuals voicing issues to their supervisors or managers (Miceli & Near, 1989; Miceli, 
Rehg, Near, & Ryan, 1999). Finally, researchers have found that the degree of job security 
that an individual has can determine the likelihood of voicing behaviours (Bacharach & 
Bamberger, 2004; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, & Mainous, 1988). This relationship is 
strengthened if the individual has alternative employment opportunities, probably because 
they do not need their current employment as much as someone who has no alternatives 
(Rusbult et al., 1988). 
To summarise, common findings indicate that several factors can determine workers’ 
willingness to report workplace issues, including workplace safety climate and culture, the 
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supervisor’s or manager’s leadership style, the effectiveness of the hazard reporting system, 
the individual’s job security, and the presence of organisational policies or laws that protect 
whistle-blowers (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Mark, et al., 2007). 
Each of these factors can determine the likelihood of a worker expecting undesirable 
outcomes if they voice their ideas or concerns to their supervisor or manager, which 
potentially could cause workers to neutralise hazards instead of reporting them (Bienefeld & 
Grote, 2012; Cortina & Magley, 2003; Detert & Edmondson, 2011). This is particularly 
likely for minor hazards, as research indicates that individuals are less likely to report minor 
hazards compared to serious or life-threatening hazards (e.g. Evans, et al., 2006; Lawton & 
Parker, 2002; Lu, 2014). This is likely due to workers considering serious or life-threatening 
hazards to be worth the inconvenience caused by voicing, as they are more easily recognised 
as capable of causing severe injury or death. In comparison, minor hazards are often not 
associated with serious injuries or death, as is evident in the Cave Creek tragedy, therefore 
any negative outcomes caused by voicing are probably not considered worth the risk. As 
such, workers may simply neutralise minor hazards themselves as the effort required could be 
less of an inconvenience than the negative outcomes from voicing behaviours. 
Research on workplace safety outcomes suggests several variables which have not been 
specifically linked to safety voicing behaviours or worker reactions to safety hazards, but 
could still influence the relationships between any of the aforementioned variables and 
workers’ reactions. These include an individual’s previous experience of workplace incidents 
and injuries, their safety consciousness, their tendency to undertake risky behaviours, and 
their aversion to making a scene. 
Avoiding undue attention 
Popular social psychology research indicates that individuals try to avoid making a scene 
wherever possible, as the majority of people do not enjoy “bad” attention, which is evident 
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from social conformity and social influence research (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005; 
Moore, 1852). For example, consider the results of Asch’s conformity experiments which 
utilised a line perception task. The majority of participants simply agreed with the actors who 
were providing incorrect answers, as they did not wish to draw attention to themselves by 
disagreeing. Several studies have since replicated these findings, using multiple 
methodologies, therefore providing support that this phenomenon is applicable in many 
different scenarios (e.g. Crutchfield, 1955; Spitzer, Fischbacher, Herrnberger, Grön, & Fehr, 
2007). To the author’s knowledge, there is no research specifically linking this phenomenon 
to safety voicing or safety outcomes in the workplace, however it is logical to deduce that the 
same principles apply for safety-related concerns as for other scenarios. That is, individuals 
may be less willing to draw attention to themselves by using their safety voice if they do not 
consider the hazard to be threatening enough. Therefore, they may attempt to neutralise the 
hazard to avoid the unwanted attention. Because the experimental manipulation in this study 
altered the severity of hazards presented to participants, it was predicted that: 
Hypothesis 1: More participants in the low-risk condition will neutralise hazards than 
report them. 
Furthermore, the second hypothesis was based off of the aforementioned reasoning, albeit 
with an addendum. While people try to avoid making a scene wherever possible, it was 
expected that the types of hazards present in the high-risk condition would warrant such a 
scene. Additionally, it was expected that the majority of participants would not possess the 
necessary skills to neutralise the types of hazards present; therefore the second hypothesis 
predicted that: 
Hypothesis 2: More participants in the high-risk condition will report hazards than 
neutralise them. 
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Note that this is the opposite relationship to that predicted in the first hypothesis, as 
participants were expected to react differently to the types of hazards present in each 
condition. Another factor which could potentially have an effect on an individual’s reactions 
to safety hazards is their safety consciousness and how often they undertake risky behaviour. 
Safety consciousness and risk-taking 
Several researchers have found that safety consciousness and dangerous risk taking in the 
workplace are significant predictors of workplace injuries and incidents (Barling, Louglin, & 
Kelloway, 2002; Westaby & Lee, 2003). In particular, higher ratings of safety consciousness 
are related to fewer injuries and incidents, while higher ratings of risk-taking are associated 
with more injuries and incidents (Rees, 2005; Westaby & Lee, 2003; Zhao, Han, Wen, & 
Zhang, 2014). The definition of safety consciousness varies across studies, with some 
researchers defining it as an individual’s awareness of safety issues in the immediate 
environment (Barling et al., 2002; de Koster, Stam, & Balk, 2011; Kelloway, Mullen, & 
Francis, 2006). However, this definition is very similar to that of situational awareness, just 
with a safety focus. As such, the following definition was used: safety consciousness is an 
awareness and positive attitude towards acting safely across all situations. This definition has 
been utilised by several researchers in an effort to make the concept applicable in both non-
work and work domains (e.g. Conrad, Bradshaw, Lamsudin, Kasniyah, & Costello, 1996; 
Westaby & Lee 2003). 
Interestingly, some research in this area is contradictory; for example, de Koster, et al., 
(2011) found that safety consciousness was not a significant predictor of safety performance 
in warehouses when considering safety-specific transformational leadership and hazard-
reducing systems. Conversely, Barling, et al., (2002) found that safety consciousness was a 
significant mediating variable in the relationship between safety-specific transformational 
leadership and safety outcomes in restaurants. Similarly, Kelloway et al., (2006) found that 
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safety consciousness was a significant mediating variable when predicting safety outcomes 
from leadership style. While these discrepancies mean it is difficult to know if safety 
consciousness will have an impact on safety outcomes, it is clear that safety consciousness 
should definitely be considered. 
To the author’s knowledge, there are no published studies which explicitly examine the 
link between safety consciousness and workers’ reactions to safety hazards. However, despite 
this lack of research, it was determined important enough to include as a control variable to 
ensure that the groups of participants were equivalent. As Westaby and Lee (2003) speculate, 
an individual who has high levels of awareness and strong positive attitude towards acting 
safely is likely to do whatever is necessary to reduce the threat posed by workplace hazards. 
Informing co-workers and/or supervisors about a safety risk is one way of reducing the threat 
posed by said risk, as the person who has been informed can either neutralise the hazard or 
avoid the hazard. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that an individual with high levels of 
safety consciousness may be more likely to undertake safety voicing behaviours or 
neutralising behaviours, so it is important to measure individuals’ safety consciousness levels 
when examining peoples’ reactions to hazards. In turn, an individual’s safety consciousness 
level could be affected by their history of workplace incidents and injuries. 
Workers’ incident and injury history 
An individual’s history of workplace injuries and incidents could be related to their 
reactions towards safety hazards. To the author’s knowledge, no research has specifically 
examined the link between the amount of incidents that an individual has previously 
experienced and their current reactions to safety hazards, such as voicing or neutralising 
behaviours. As such, each of the possibilities discussed below are based upon common sense 
logic and research from similar fields that could factor into the equation.  
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As mentioned previously, an individual’s safety knowledge, workplace safety climate, and 
their safety consciousness levels may have an impact on behaviours that they express in 
response to safety hazards. As several researchers have found that safety consciousness levels 
are negatively correlated to workplace injuries and incidents, it is possible that the number of 
incidents that an individual has been involved in might not be directly related to behavioural 
outcomes in response to hazards (Barling et al., 2002; Westaby & Lee, 2003). Or, any 
relationship between previous incidents and current voicing behaviours could be mediated by 
the individual’s safety knowledge and safety consciousness. 
However, it is also possible that an individual’s safety consciousness and safety 
knowledge could be affected by the amount of incidents that they have previously been 
involved in. In particular, organisations tend to give extra safety training if certain employees 
are accident-prone or take too many risks. Therefore, if an individual experiences more 
workplace accidents, then they may increase their safety knowledge, and potentially become 
more safety conscious. This could have a flow-on effect to their workplace behaviours, 
leading them to inform others of safety hazards rather than remaining silent or neutralise 
hazards rather than ignoring them. 
Of course, it is entirely possible that an individual’s history of workplace injuries and 
incidents has no relationship whatsoever to their safety-related behaviours. Thus, it is 
important to at least consider it as a potential control variable when examining workplace 
safety behaviours. 
The Current Study 
As mentioned above, current health and safety research has examined the link between types 
of safety hazards and voicing outcomes. The majority of research has consistent findings, 
indicating that several factors influence an individual’s decision to use their safety voice. 
However, no known research has examined the possibility that individuals could simply be 
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neutralising safety hazards instead of reporting them. Therefore the aim of this study was to 
fill this crucial gap in the literature by examining how individuals react to two different levels 
of safety hazards, by measuring whether they neutralise, report, or ignore the hazards. This 
built upon the research undertaken by Lu (2014), which examined the effect of differing 
levels of safety hazards on individuals’ voicing behaviours. This study utilised two conditions 
to compare participants’ reactions to either low-risk or high-risk hazards.  
As mentioned above, the first two hypotheses were based off of social psychology 
research examining social conformity. As individuals try to avoid attracting too much 
attention to themselves, it is possible that individuals consider minor hazards to not be worth 
the extra attention. Therefore, the first hypothesis asserted the following: 
Hypothesis 1: More participants in the low-risk condition will neutralise hazards than 
report them. 
Furthermore, the second hypothesis was based off of the aforementioned reasoning, albeit 
with an addendum. While people try to avoid making a scene wherever possible, it was 
expected that the types of hazards present in the high-risk condition would warrant such a 
scene. Additionally, it was expected that the majority of participants would not possess the 
necessary skills to neutralise the types of hazards present; therefore the second hypothesis 
predicted that: 
Hypothesis 2: More participants in the high-risk condition will report hazards than 
neutralise them. 
Note that this is the opposite relationship to that predicted in the first hypothesis, as 
participants were expected to react differently to the types of hazards present in each 
condition. As individuals report that they are more likely to report high-risk hazards than 
low-risk hazards (Evans et al., 2006; Lu, 2014), the third hypothesis states the following: 
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Hypothesis 3: More participants in the high-risk condition will report hazards than 
participants in the low-risk condition. 
However, due to the untrained nature of the planned participant pool and their expected 
unwillingness to attempt to neutralise electrical hazards or neutralise any danger presented by 
the hazard, the fourth hypothesis asserted the following: 
Hypothesis 4: Fewer participants in the high-risk condition will neutralise hazards than 
participants in the low-risk condition. 
In summary, the aim of this study was to examine how individuals react to high-risk or 
low-risk safety hazards by measuring whether they report, ignore, or make the hazards safe. 
Individuals’ reasons for doing nothing were also collected, however no predictions were 
made regarding that data. Four hypotheses were proposed in an effort to better understand 
how individuals react to different types of safety hazards in an office environment. 
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Method 
Design 
The study used a between-groups experimental design as approved by the University of 
Canterbury Ethics Committee. Two conditions were used: low-risk and high-risk. Each 
condition contained three “safety hazards” which are considered to be of the same category as 
the condition label (i.e. the high-risk condition contained three high-risk safety hazards). The 
hazards were located throughout the experiment environment, as shown in Appendix A and 
B. Note that the “hazards” were not dangerous to participants; each hazard was perfectly safe 
and only appeared to be a hazard (see Table 3 and 4 for descriptions of each hazard). The 
dependent variables were the report-, neutralise-, and notice-rates of participants; that is, how 
participants reacted to the hazards. Participants were misled regarding the nature of the study 
to prevent pro-social behaviour; they believed that the experiment was to determine common 
information-retrieval techniques through the use of an office-style task. 
Procedural Overview 
The study involved two sessions approximately 12-48 hours apart. In the first session, 
participants completed an office-style task that involved searching for postal information on a 
computer, then addressing envelopes with that information. The second session involved the 
participant answering some questions about the hazards that were present in the room during 
the first session and their reactions to the hazards. After completion of these items, 
participants were debriefed to inform them of the true nature of the study then given the 
appropriate reward for completing the study. Table 1 shows the experiment stages and 
provides explanations for each step. 
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Table 1: 
Overview of each experiment stage 
 
 
Experiment Stage 
 
 
Reason/explanation 
 
1. Session 1 Part 1: Greeting and 
instruction-giving 
 
Was undertaken at a calm pace to allow participants to 
become comfortable talking with the experimenter and 
ensure they knew how to complete the task. 
 
2. Session 1 Part 2: Office task Was completed at participants’ own pace and was 
designed so they would move around the room, increasing 
the likelihood that they would notice hazards. 
 
3. Interphase interval A 12-48 hour break between the first and second sessions 
to allow participants the chance to talk to someone about 
any hazards that they noticed. Without this break, any use 
of safety voice would have been limited to the 
experimenter. 
 
4. Session 2 Part 1: Follow-up 
questionnaire 
A follow-up questionnaire was completed by participants 
to measure control variables and to determine if any 
participants had noticed hazards but not neutralised or 
reported them. 
 
5. Session 2 Part 2: Debrief Participants were informed of the true purpose of the 
study, as required by ethical guidelines. Expected results 
were discussed, and participants were offered a final 
chance to withdraw their data. 
 
 
Participants 
The participants were 54 students at the University of Canterbury, 47 of whom were 
undergraduate students. Participation was voluntary and participants were randomly assigned 
to an experimental condition. Across both conditions, there were 16 males and 38 females; 
they ranged in age from 18 to 42 years (M = 21.87, SD = 5.03). The demographic information 
of participants for each condition is shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. 
Demographic information of participants by condition 
 
  
Low-risk 
(N = 27) 
 
 
High-risk 
(N = 27) 
 
Males 
 
6 
 
10 
Females 21 17 
Mean age 
 
23.15 
(6.38) 
 
20.59 
(2.74) 
 
All participants provided informed consent by signing a consent form before beginning the 
experiment. However, completion of the experiment was considered a final affirmation of 
informed consent, as all participants were provided with multiple chances to withdraw from 
the study due to the necessary deceit. That is, participants were purposefully misinformed to 
believe that the office-style task was the main purpose of the study to prevent socially 
desirable responses in reaction to hazards. 
Recruitment 
Eight participants were rewarded with course credit upon completion of participation, as per 
their first-year psychology course requirements. These participants were recruited through the 
course website, which advertised multiple studies that could be completed for course credit. 
The remainder of participants were given a $10 Westfield or petrol voucher as a reward upon 
completion of their participation. These participants were recruited through the use of poster-
style advertisements which were placed on noticeboards around the university (see Appendix 
C). 
Materials 
Experimental stimuli – first session. Table 3 and 4 outline the fake safety hazards that 
were used in each condition, while providing photos of each hazard (Appendix A provides 
larger versions of each photo). Additionally, Figures 1 and 2 show the exact position of each 
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hazard in the room using a diagram of the room layout – each hazard is highlighted in red 
(larger versions of these diagrams are available in Appendix B). Participants completed an 
office-style information-retrieval task that involved the labelling of envelopes with postage 
information. Each participant was required to obtain the address and the name of the school’s 
careers advisor for five schools from a list that was provided. This was done to ensure that 
participants would not spend time looking up schools that did not provide the relevant 
information on their websites, as this would cause unnecessary delays. Appendix D contains 
the written instructions that participants received. 
 
Figure 1. 
Diagram of hazard positions in the low-risk condition 
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Figure 2. 
Diagram of hazard positions in the high-risk condition 
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Table 3. 
Hazard descriptions for low-risk condition 
 
Hazard 
Label 
Hazard description and location 
Why the hazard posed no 
threat 
Actions to make the 
hazard safe 
Photo of hazard 
 
Trip 
Hazard 
 
 An extension cord was laid across 
the floor near a door, with the anti-
trip safety cover moved slightly out 
of place. 
 This could result in someone 
tripping if they walked through the 
door. 
 
 The door was locked so that 
nobody could come through 
it. 
 
 The participant was 
able to move the 
extension cord so that 
it would no longer be 
a trip hazard. 
 
Falling 
Hazard 
 An empty glass chemical jar was 
placed on a high shelf (on the 
bookcase). 
 It appeared to be a falling hazard, 
as it was “teetering” on the edge of 
the shelf. 
 The jar was attached to a 
pivot so that it could not 
fall off the shelf. 
 
 To make this hazard 
safe, the participant 
simply needed to push 
the jar back onto the 
shelf. 
 
Glass  A picture frame with broken glass 
was leaning against the sink unit 
on the floor. 
 Broken glass was lying on the floor 
next to the picture frame. 
 The glass shards looked sharp 
enough to cut. 
 
 The glass was actually a 
realistic-looking rubber 
movie prop that cannot hurt 
participants. 
 A brush and shovel 
was placed nearby to 
allow participants to 
move any “glass” 
shards off the floor. 
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Table 4. 
Hazard descriptions for high-risk condition 
 
Hazard 
Label 
Hazard description and location Why the hazard posed no threat 
Actions to make the hazard 
safe 
Photo of hazard 
Exposed 
wiring 
 A lamp on the desk where the 
participant worked had wires 
with the insulation visibly 
damaged/removed from part of 
the wire 
 Cord was plugged into a wall 
socket, the socket was turned on 
 Wall socket was disconnected 
and not conducting electricity 
 
 The on/off switch was 
turned on at the wall 
socket, allowing 
participants to turn it off 
 The on/off switch on the 
lamp cord was set to the 
on position, which could 
also be turned off 
 
Faulty 
appliance 
 A fan heater was emitting 
sparking/arcing noises similar to 
white noise and flashing 
simultaneously. This was 
controlled by the experimenter to 
spark once every 3 minutes 
 This situation is an obvious fire 
hazard, as the heater could ignite 
due to the sparking 
 The heater contained a sound 
device which had a recording of 
electrical arcing. The sound 
recording was downloaded from 
Pond5™, however the artist has 
since removed the recording. 
 The heater also contained a blue 
LED which flickered in 
synchronisation with the arcing 
noises 
 Participants could turn the 
heater off at the wall to 
stop the sparking sound 
and flickering LED 
 
Water 
near 
multi-
board 
 A mug with some water in it 
next to a multi-board 
 Some spilt water on the desk 
next to the multi-board, 
simulating an electrocution or 
fire hazard. 
 The wall socket that the multi-
board was plugged into was 
disconnected from the power 
supply 
 
 
 
 
 A cloth was positioned 
nearby that participants 
could use to clean up the 
water 
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Experimental stimuli – second session. Despite random assignment, variables related to 
hazard reporting such as previous experience of injuries, employment safety level, individual 
safety orientation, and situational awareness were measured to ensure there were no between-
group differences. The following items and scales were used to measure demographic 
information, situational awareness, employment safety level, previous experience of injuries, 
and individual safety orientation. All items are presented in Appendix E. 
Previous Injury Experience and Employment Safety Level. Individuals’ past experience 
of workplace accidents and incidents were measured using three items, “Near miss incidents, 
which had it turned out differently, could have resulted in injury or damage”, “Minor injuries 
requiring medical attention (e.g. first aid treatment or a visit to the doctor)”, and “Lost Time 
Injury (LTI) that has required you to take time off school/university/work”. Participants 
responded to these three items by writing the number of times that they had experienced each 
type of incident. Participants’ current employment safety levels were measured using a single 
item “Does your current job have a safety component? (E.g. could you be hurt doing this 
job?)”. Participants responded to this item by ticking “Yes” or “No”. 
Safety Consciousness. Safety consciousness was measured using the 12-item safety 
consciousness and risk-taking scale developed by Westaby and Lee (2003). Example items 
include “People think of me as being an extremely safety-minded person” and “I get upset 
when I see other people acting dangerously”. Participants responded to these items using a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). The safety-
consciousness subscale consists of items 1 through 7, while items 8 through 12 make up the 
risk-taking subscale. Westaby and Lee (2003) reported a coefficient alpha of .85 for the 
safety consciousness items and a coefficient alpha of .77 for the risk-taking subscale. In this 
study, the coefficient alpha was .68 for the safety consciousness subscale, and .76 for the 
risk-taking subscale. However, Cronbach’s alpha could be improved to .73 by removing item 
six “I get upset when I see other people acting dangerously”, so this item was removed. 
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Safety consciousness ratings were calculated for each participant by adding all scores on the 
safety consciousness subscale excluding item six, then dividing by the number of items 
(Westaby & Lee, 2003). The same methodology was used to obtain risk-taking scores for 
each participant for the risk-taking subscale (Westaby & Lee, 2003).  A higher score on the 
safety consciousness subscale is indicative of higher levels of safety consciousness, whereas 
a higher score on the risk-taking subscale indicates higher levels of risk-taking behaviour. 
Situational Awareness.  
The QUASA technique was utilised to obtain an objective measure of participants’ 
situational awareness (McGuinness, 2004). Ten true/false statements were generated about 
the experiment environment to objectively measure each individual’s knowledge of the 
experiment environment – their situational awareness. Additionally, 5-point confidence 
ratings for each true/false statement were utilised, ranging from Very Low (1) to Very High 
(5). Example items include “There is carpet on the floor of the experiment room” and “There 
were two (2) chairs in the experiment room”. The true/false statements were scored by 
summing the correct number of responses by each participant, to give a score out of ten (e.g. 
six). The confidence ratings were scored by summing the ratings for each item and dividing 
the result by the number of items, which was recorded as the SA Confidence. A higher SA 
score indicated that the individual had correctly recalled more features of the experimental 
environment. Additionally, a higher SA Confidence score indicates higher levels of 
confidence with the true/false answers provided. 
Dependent Variables. Additionally, the experimental materials included items for 
measuring whether the individual noticed any hazards, their reactions to any hazard that they 
noticed, and their reasons for neutralising, ignoring, or reporting each hazard (see Appendix 
E for the full questionnaire). This was based on the premise that individuals may notice a 
hazard but choose to do nothing whatsoever about it; directly asking participants is the only 
way to measure this. The dependent variables were the report-rate, the neutralise-rate, and the 
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notice-rate. The notice rate is the number of hazards that each participant correctly identified 
– several participants suggested hazards which were not present in the experimental 
environment. The report rate is whether or not a participant informed the experimenter about 
any hazards, while the neutralise rate is whether or not a participant neutralised any of the 
hazards. The report-rate and neutralise-rate were recorded by the experimenter immediately 
after each participant left the room using a checklist (see Appendix F). The notice-rate of 
participants was measured using two items, “Did you notice any hazards in the room during 
the experiment?” and “In this section, please describe each hazard that you noticed in the 
room during the experiment, what you did (you can select multiple options), and if you did 
nothing, please indicate why you did nothing”. Participants answered the first item by 
selecting “Yes” or “No”. The second item was answered freely and included several options 
that participants could select, for example “told the experimenter”, “made sure I did not 
interact with the hazard (avoided it)” and “other” (see Appendix E for the full questionnaire). 
Participants were also given a space to write what they should have done given the benefit of 
hindsight. 
Procedure 
To begin the experiment, participants were greeted and invited to “sit down” and make 
themselves comfortable so they would feel comfortable talking to the experimenter. 
Participants were then provided detailed written instructions for the completion of the 
information retrieval task, shown below (see Appendix D for the document that participants 
were given): 
 
On the bookcase next to the desk there is a pile of envelopes and UC Careers 
information booklets. These booklets are to be mailed to high school career’s 
advisors throughout New Zealand to provide them with essential information 
about the types of careers that UC graduates can achieve. 
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You are required to find the postage details of five (5) high school careers 
advisors from schools in the list provided on the next page. You may use the 
provided computer to obtain this information. Note that postage details include the 
career advisor’s name and the school address. 
Neatly write the postage details on the provided envelopes (one school per 
envelope) and securely put a single booklet inside each envelope. 
Place completed envelopes inside the Out Tray that is on the table next to the 
computer desk. 
 
These materials were arranged so that participants were required to move around the room 
to increase the chance that they would notice any safety hazards (a detailed diagram of the 
room layout is provided in Appendix C). 
 
Once you have addressed, packaged, and placed all five envelopes in the out 
tray, return to the experimenter. 
 
This final instruction was included so that participants would return to the other area of the 
room upon completing the task, as the door separating the two areas was closed during the 
experiment. This prevented the need for the experimenter to enter the second area of the 
experiment room and potentially interrupt the task. 
Participants were given two minutes to read the provided instructions, then provided with 
the following verbal instructions to ensure that each participant understood the task before 
commencement: 
 
Everything you’ll be doing is in that room right there. Next to the desk is a 
bookcase with a pile of envelopes and booklets. I need you to grab five of each and 
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address them with the postage details of any five of the schools on that list. You 
can use the computer in that room to find the information that you need. Any 
questions? 
 
The room had been set up to fulfil one of two conditions prior to each participant’s arrival. 
Upon completion of the task, participants were asked “do you have anything you would like 
to say about the experiment?” After each participant left the room, the experimenter checked 
the hazards to determine if the participant had tried to mitigate the threat caused by each 
hazard (see Table 3 & 4). The experimenter then scored the participant for reporting and 
neutralising; each hazard that was reported and/or neutralised was recorded. This marked the 
end of the first session. 
The second session was scheduled 12-48 hours after the first session to allow participants 
the chance to report any hazards that they noticed to someone other than the experimenter, as 
it is more realistic to expect them to report to someone that they know. The second session 
involved a follow-up compilation of items and scales regarding the first session, followed by 
a debrief. Once participants had completed each scale, they were debriefed to explain the true 
purpose of the study and requested to keep the true purpose of the study a secret (see 
Appendix G). At this stage, participants were given a chance to withdraw their data from the 
study. Once the debrief process was completed, participants were rewarded appropriately and 
given another chance to withdraw their data from the study. 
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Results 
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics by condition for job status, job safety component, 
safety consciousness, risk-taking, and previous accident experience. The composite incident 
scores were created by summing each individual’s number of experiences for all types of 
accident experiences – LTI, minor injuries, and near misses. Although participants were 
randomly assigned to conditions, it is important to ensure that participants in each condition 
are equivalent in terms of the control variables. The ANOVA comparisons shown in the last 
column of Table 5 indicate that the groups are not different in terms of safety consciousness, 
risk-taking, or previous accident experience for any types of accidents. Additionally, job 
status and job safety component appear very similar across conditions. Therefore, any 
subsequent analyses comparing the groups would not require these variables to be controlled 
for to validate the comparison. 
Table 5. 
Unadjusted means and standard deviations of independent and control variables by condition 
 
 
Low-risk Hazards 
M (SD) 
High-risk Hazards 
M (SD) 
ANOVA Comparisons 
Job status* 2.22 
(1.01) 
2.30 
(1.03) 
N/A 
Job safety component** 1.30 
(0.47) 
1.44 
(0.64) 
N/A 
Safety consciousness 3.16 
(0.64) 
3.31 
(0.66) 
F(52,1) = .76, p = .388 
Risk-taking 2.96 
(0.78) 
2.76 
(0.81) 
F(52,1) = .85, p = .360 
Near miss incidents 6.44 
(11.56) 
11.96 
(22.19) 
F(52,1) = 1.31, p = .257 
Minor injuries 8.30 
(14.62) 
6.44 
(11.67) 
F(52,1) = .27, p = .609 
Lost time injuries (LTI) 1.26 
(1.48) 
2.15 
(4.73) 
F(52,1) = .87, p = .356 
Composite incident scores 16.00 
(25.70) 
20.56 
(33.35) 
 
F(52,1) = .32, p = .576 
* 0 = Unemployed, 1 = Casual, 2 = Part-time, 3 = Full-time 
** 1 = No safety risk, 2 = Safety risk 
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Hypothesis testing 
Table 6 shows the immediate responses of participants as recorded by the experimenter, 
in particular whether they neutralised or reported any hazards. This shows that very few 
participants reported the hazards to the experimenter or neutralised the hazards during the 
experiment. While these data do address the hypotheses, too few participants neutralised or 
reported hazards to test each hypothesis statistically. However, given the numbers, hypothesis 
one is not supported, as the same amount of participants reported and neutralised low-risk 
hazards. However, the data tentatively supports hypothesis two, as more participants reported 
than neutralised high-risk hazards. Additionally, hypothesis three is also not supported by the 
data, as report-rates were the same across conditions. Hypothesis four was also tentatively 
supported, as fewer participants attempted to neutralise high-risk hazards compared to low-
risk hazards. The appropriate statistical analysis for these hypotheses is a comparison of two 
binomial proportions. However, due to the tiny proportions of each condition that reported or 
neutralised hazards, this analysis cannot be undertaken.  
Table 6. 
 Neutralise- and report-rates of participants recorded immediately after completion of the 
office task 
 
 
Percentage of the 
sample that neutralised 
each hazard 
 
Percentage of the 
sample that reported 
each hazard 
 
High-risk hazard condition 
  
 Sparking fan heater 3.74% 7.41% 
 Desk lamp with exposed wiring 0% 0% 
 Multi-board next to water puddle 
 
0% 0% 
Low-risk hazard condition   
 Broken picture frame with glass shards on 
floor 
7.41% 7.41% 
 Chemical container on high shelf as 
falling hazard 
0% 0% 
 Extension cord as trip hazard 0% 0% 
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Extra analyses – why did so few people report/neutralise hazards? 
Table 7 shows the number of participants that noticed each hazard. This data was 
obtained the day after the experiment, using a written questionnaire without any prompts, as 
detailed in the Experimental stimuli – second session section of the Method (Pages 24-26). 
This shows that the majority of participants did not notice the hazards; however due to the 
nature of the data, the hypotheses could not be statistically tested. Therefore, further analyses 
were undertaken to determine if there were any common factors that contributed to so few 
participants noticing the hazards. Note that some participants suggested hazards which were 
not part of the experiment; these are listed under the Other Hazards category in Table 7. 
Table 7. 
The number of participants that noticed each hazard 
 
Hazard Description N 
 
Percentage of condition 
sample that noticed each 
hazard 
 
 
High-risk hazards 
  
Sparking fan heater 9 33.33% 
Desk lamp with exposed wiring 2 7.41% 
Multi-board next to water puddle 1 3.70% 
Low-risk hazards   
Broken picture frame with glass shards 
on floor 
10 37.04% 
Chemical container on high shelf as 
falling hazard 
3 11.11% 
Extension cord as trip hazard 1 3.70% 
Other hazards   
Dim lighting 1 3.70% 
Chemical bottles on top of the 
bookcase* 
3 11.11% 
Hot water kettle beside a clock radio 1 3.70% 
Sliding door was difficult to open/close 
 
1 
 
3.70% 
 
*Note: participants included here were in the high-risk condition, where the chemical 
bottles were not included as a hazard (they were not positioned to look like they would fall). 
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Table 8 shows the reactions of participants to each hazard as recorded during the second 
session. The most common reaction was to tell someone other than the experimenter – this 
could include a friend, person of authority, or someone else. Additionally, many participants 
actively avoided the hazards or ignored them completely. Note that it is possible for a 
participant to avoid a hazard and also do nothing, as avoiding a hazard is considered a passive 
response, so the participant did not actively attempt to mitigate the danger caused by the 
hazard. But if they attempted to neutralise the hazard while also avoiding it, then they have 
taken decisive action. Table 9 shows what participants said they should have done given the 
benefit of hindsight. The most common response was that they should have informed the 
experimenter about the hazard, while the second most common response was that the 
participant should have neutralised the hazard. Surprisingly, two participants stated that they 
should have done nothing whatsoever about the broken glass, suggesting that they did not 
consider it to be sufficiently dangerous. 
Table 10 includes the reasons that participants listed for doing nothing about hazards that 
they noticed. The most commonly listed reason was that the hazard seemed inconsequential, 
especially in regards to the sparking fan heater. Additionally, three participants believed that 
the broken glass was intentionally placed, not dangerous, and obviously part of the 
experiment as a memory test. 
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Table 8. 
Participant reactions to each hazard 
 
Hazard Description N 
 
Percentage of 
condition sample that 
noticed each hazard 
 
Told the 
Experimenter 
Told 
Someone 
Else 
Neutralised 
the Hazard 
Attempted 
to make it 
safe 
Avoided 
it 
Nothing 
 
Sparking fan heater 
 
9 
 
33.33% 
 
2 
 
4 
 
1 
 
0 
 
4 
 
5 
Desk lamp with exposed 
wiring 
2 7.41% 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Multi-board next to water 
puddle 
1 3.70% 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Broken picture frame with 
glass shards on floor 
10 37.04% 2 1 2 1 1 6 
Chemical container on high 
shelf as falling hazard 
3 11.11% 0 1 0 0 3 2 
Extension cord as trip hazard 
 
1 
 
3.70% 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
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Table 9. 
Hindsight statements of ideal responses to hazards 
 
Hazard Description N 
 
Percentage of 
condition sample that 
noticed each hazard 
 
Told the 
Experimenter 
Neutralised 
the Hazard 
Paid more 
Attention 
Nothing 
 
Sparking fan heater 
 
9 
 
33.33% 
 
7 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
Desk lamp with exposed 
wiring 
2 7.41% 1 0 1 0 
Multi-board next to water 
puddle 
1 3.70% 1 0 0 0 
Broken picture frame with 
glass shards on floor 
10 37.04% 4 6 0 2 
Chemical container on high 
shelf as falling hazard 
3 11.11% 1 1 0 0 
Extension cord as trip hazard 
 
1 
 
3.70% 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
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Table 10. 
Participants’ reasons for doing nothing 
 
Reasons for doing 
nothing 
Desk lamp with 
exposed wiring 
Sparking fan heater 
Multi-board next to 
water puddle 
Chemical container 
on high shelf as 
falling hazard 
Extension cord as 
trip hazard 
Broken picture 
frame with glass 
shards on floor 
 
Hazard was 
inconsequential. 
 
1 
 
5 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
Reporting was futile. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fixing the hazard was 
too difficult. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Not sure how to 
make the hazard safe. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fixing the hazard 
would endanger 
myself. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Did not want to 
offend the researcher. 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
Did not want to 
prolong the 
experiment. 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Too shy to say 
anything. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Did not care enough 
to mention it or fix it. 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
It seemed 
intentionally placed. 
0 0 0 0 0 3 
It was not dangerous. 0 0 0 0 0 3 
It was obviously part 
of the experiment as 
a memory test. 
 
0 0 0 1 0 3 
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Situational awareness 
Participants’ data was then split into two groups based on whether or not the participants 
noticed any hazards. That is, one group consisted of participants who noticed hazards, while 
the other group consisted of participants who did not notice any hazards. Twenty-two 
participants noticed at least one hazard, while 32 participants did not. Additionally, it was 
noted that 12 participants expected a distraction to occur to divert them from the experiment 
task, as the experiment was being conducted in the Psychology Department. Four of these 
participants had noticed the sparking fan heater, but “assumed it was simply being used as a 
distraction from the task and was not dangerous until you asked if I noticed any hazards in 
the room”. The remainder failed to notice any hazards, as they “blocked out any potential 
distractions and focussed entirely on the task”. 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was a significant difference in 
situational awareness scores and confidence ratings between these two groups of participants. 
The ANOVA indicated a significant difference between-groups for attention scores,  
F(52,1) = 7.86, p = .007, with means of 5.56 for participants who did not notice anything and 
6.59 for participants that noticed hazards. However, there was no significant difference 
between-groups for SA confidence ratings, F(52,1) = 1.88, p = .176, with means of 3.06 for 
participants who did not notice anything and 3.34 for participants that noticed hazards. 
Workplace incident experience 
Table 11 shows ANOVA comparisons that were conducted to determine if there were any 
significant differences in past accident experiences between participants who noticed hazards 
and those that did not notice hazards. Separate ANOVAs were undertaken for each type of 
incident, and another used the composite incident scores mentioned above. None of the 
results were significant, indicating that participants who noticed hazards have similar 
experience of workplace incidents to their counterparts who did not notice hazards. 
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Another one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if there were any significant 
differences in current employment safety focus between participants who noticed hazards and 
those that did not notice hazards. There was no significant difference between-groups,  
F(52,1) = .01, p = .934. 
Table 11. 
ANOVA comparisons of injury experience between participants who noticed hazards and 
those who did not 
 
 
 
Participants who 
noticed hazards 
(N = 22) 
 
Participants who did 
not notice hazards 
(N = 32) 
ANOVA Comparisons 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
 
 
Near Miss Incidents 
 
7.27 
(11.81) 
 
10.53 
(20.96) 
 
F(52,1) = .44, p = .512 
Minor Injuries 5.00 
(8.52) 
9.00 
(15.46) 
F(52,1) = 1.21, p = .276 
Lost Time Injuries 1.41 
(3.19) 
1.91 
(3.74) 
F(52,1) = .26, p = .613 
Composite Incident 
Score 
 
13.68 
(22.00) 
21.44 
(33.81) 
F(52,1) = .89, p = .349 
 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if there were any significant differences 
in safety consciousness and risk-taking behaviours between participants who noticed hazards 
and those that did not notice hazards. As expected, there was a significant difference 
between-groups for safety consciousness ratings, F(52,1) = 9.56, p = .003, with means of 
3.45 for participants who did not notice anything and 2.93 for participants that noticed 
hazards. However, there was no significant difference between these two groups for risk-
taking ratings, F(52,1) = 1.10, p = .297. 
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Additionally, Pearson correlations were calculated to determine if participants’ situational 
awareness scores were significantly related to whether or not they noticed any hazards. 
Within the low-risk condition, participants’ situational awareness scores were significantly 
related to whether or not they noticed a hazard, r = 0.57, p = 0.003. However, this 
relationship was not significant within the high-risk condition, r = .20, p = .329. 
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Discussion 
The aim of this study was to compare the rates at which individuals reported, neutralised, 
and ignored low-risk and high-risk safety hazards. The research tested four hypotheses 
regarding the expected behavioural outcomes between experimental conditions. Hypotheses 
one and two were related to the within-condition hazard report-rate versus neutralise-rate of 
participants, while hypotheses three and four were related to differences in hazard report-rate 
versus neutralise-rate of participants across experimental conditions. 
Given that such a small proportion of participants actually reported or neutralised 
hazards, the planned analyses could not be undertaken to test the hypotheses. However, this 
was a result in itself, and the unexpected high level of failure to neutralise or report hazards is 
discussed below. Of the 54 participants who completed the experiment, 22 noticed at least 
one safety hazard in the experimental environment. However, of these 22 participants, only 
four neutralised any hazard, while three reported a hazard. This is a startlingly low 
proportion, as previous research suggests that the majority of people indicate they will at least 
report a serious hazard to whomever is capable of addressing the issue (Evans, et al., 2006; 
Lawton & Parker, 2002; Lu, 2014). However, as these results show, of the thirteen 
participants who noticed a serious hazard, only two voiced their concerns to the 
experimenter, while another neutralised the hazard by turning the sparking appliance off at 
the wall socket. 
This discrepancy in findings could be due to the type of data utilised, as previous studies 
have relied on self-report data based on hypothetical situations. Self-report data is highly 
susceptible to manipulation, as individuals can respond in socially desirable ways to create a 
better impression of themselves. This study was designed so that this simply was not 
possible, as individuals’ behaviour towards the hazards was measured in an experimental 
environment. Additionally, participants did not know that their behaviour towards the hazards 
39 
 
 
was the main focus of the study, so they would feel no need to respond in socially desirable 
ways. These findings show the importance of utilising objective data to study safety 
whenever possible, rather than relying on self-report data, which can be easily manipulated 
by participants. 
While the main hypotheses could not be statistically tested due to the low number of 
participants who reacted to hazards, there was enough data from the post-experiment 
questionnaire to compare participants who said they noticed hazards to those who did not 
notice hazards. This data was examined to determine if any variables were significantly 
related to whether or not individuals’ noticed any hazards. A significant between-groups 
difference was found for participants’ situational awareness scores, indicating that 
participants who noticed hazards had significantly higher awareness scores than those who 
did not notice hazards. Essentially, this finding shows that individuals who noticed hazards 
were more attentive to the experimental environment, rather than simply focussing all of their 
attention on the experimental task. This finding supports the use of a QUASA technique as a 
valid measure of situational awareness for identifying items which are present in the 
environment. 
Additionally, a significant difference was found in safety consciousness ratings between 
participants who noticed safety hazards and those who did not notice any hazards. However, 
the relationship was in the opposite direction to what previous safety research has found, with 
lower safety consciousness ratings for participants who noticed hazards. At first glance, this 
seems contradictory to previous research, which shows that individuals with higher safety 
consciousness ratings are more likely to notice and report hazards (e.g. Conrad et al., 1996; 
Westaby & Lee, 2003), however these studies relied purely on self-report data which is 
susceptible to manipulation. Additionally, if one considers pro-social behaviours, then the 
current results make more sense. In particular, the order that participants answered questions 
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must be taken into consideration; participants were first asked if they noticed any safety 
hazards and what those hazards were, while the safety consciousness scale was completed 
later. This means that participants were probably thinking about the safety hazards while 
answering the scale items. This may have influenced their responses to the safety 
consciousness scale, as discussed below. 
It is possible that participants who did not notice safety hazards inflated their safety-
consciousness ratings to make up for their lack of attentiveness during the experiment. In 
comparison, participants who did notice safety hazards would feel no need to rate themselves 
highly on the safety consciousness scale items, as they were able to provide examples of 
hazards in the first part of the questionnaire, rather than skipping those items. This finding 
outlines how important it is to consider prosocial behaviours when using self-report data, as 
results can be altered considerably if participants wish to provide a certain impression of 
themselves. This is why the study relied on objective data as much as possible, while 
minimising the use of self-report data. 
Additionally, participants’ situational awareness ratings were significantly related to 
whether or not they noticed any hazards within the low-risk condition, but there was no 
significant relationship within the high-risk condition. This seems to suggest that the hazards 
utilised in the high-risk condition may have been more noticeable than those in the low-risk 
condition. In particular, it is likely that this was due to the sparking noise emitted by the fan 
heater, which was the only auditory-based stimulus; every other hazard was purely visual, 
requiring participants to observe their surroundings. This is supported by the data, as 9 
participants noticed the heater, while only two noticed the exposed wires on the desk lamp 
and one noticed the water next to the multi-board. This could explain why situational 
awareness scores were not significantly related to participants noticing high-risk hazards, as 
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awareness of their surroundings may not have been necessary to notice the noise created by 
the sparking heater. 
Individuals’ previous incident history, current employment safety levels, risk-taking 
ratings, and situational awareness confidence ratings were not significantly different between 
participants who noticed hazards and those who did not notice hazards. While there is no 
previous research that has examined the relationship between an individual’s previous 
incident history and their likelihood of noticing hazards, it might be expected that individuals 
who had experienced more workplace incidents would be more likely to notice hazards, as 
their experiences would cause them to be more cautious. However, it is possible that some 
individuals who have experienced more incidents are simply less attentive of their 
environment, which would cancel out any relationship if other participants are more cautious 
due to their unfortunate experiences. 
Additionally, an individual’s current employment safety risk was not related to whether 
or not participants noticed hazards. This variable was included as a control variable to ensure 
that each group of participants were statistically equivalent on any variables which might 
have an effect on their reactions to safety hazards. While no known research specifically 
examines the link between safety behaviours and employment safety risk, it was considered 
to be a potentially significant factor as individuals with higher risk jobs are likely to have 
undertaken more safety training, and therefore be more aware of hazards or have higher 
levels of safety consciousness. 
Also, an individual’s risk-taking ratings were not significantly different between 
participants who noticed hazards and those who did not notice hazards. However, these 
ratings may have suffered from pro-social biases, as every individual who did not report or 
neutralise a hazard was undertaking risky behaviour simply by working in a room alongside 
“safety hazards” then leaving the room in a “dangerous” condition when leaving. This again 
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highlights the importance of considering potential differences between self-report data versus 
actual behaviour. This in itself is an important finding, as risky behaviour has been shown to 
be related to higher rates of injuries and incidents in the workplace (e.g. Rees, 2005; Zhao et 
al., 2014). Therefore, organisations that wish to reduce the amount of workplace safety 
incidents may need to target their workers’ attitudes towards risky behaviour instead of 
increasing awareness of hazards, as many participants who noticed hazards did nothing 
whatsoever about them. Although, it is possible that increasing awareness of hazards and the 
risks they pose could change workers’ reactions towards risky behaviour, simply by 
improving their knowledge of how badly they could be hurt if they continued taking risks. 
Finally, an individual’s situational awareness confidence ratings were not significantly 
different between participants who noticed hazards and those who did not notice hazards. 
Memory research would expect individuals who noticed more hazards to be more confident 
with their responses to the situational awareness true/false items, as they would believe they 
had a more complete perception of what was in the room by remembering more (e.g. 
Anooshian, Ashbrook, & Hertel, 1985). However, these findings show that this is not the 
case. 
The most likely explanation for this finding is that individuals who did not notice hazards 
may have overcompensated with their confidence ratings to make up for their lack of 
attention. Meanwhile, individuals who did notice hazards may have given more accurate 
confidence ratings, without feeling the need to be overly modest or overconfident. Another 
possibility is that participants who noticed safety hazards gave low to moderate confidence 
ratings as they thought that they should have noticed more hazards than they did. Either of 
these occurrences would have resulted in our finding of extremely similar average confidence 
ratings for each group. This finding highlights the importance of using an objective measure 
of situational awareness alongside a subjective measure, rather than solely using a subjective 
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measure. If participants had simply been asked to rate how well they knew what was in the 
room, then the ratings could have been completely different to their actual knowledge. By 
including true/false probes and confidence ratings, it is possible to compare participants’ 
opinions of their situational awareness to their actual situational awareness. 
Additionally, this finding can be used to argue the importance of using objective data 
instead of self-report data when examining individuals’ voicing and neutralising behaviours 
in response to safety hazards. As mentioned above, previous safety research has relied solely 
on self-report data, which can be easily manipulated by participants to create socially 
desirable results. In contrast, objective experimental data is not susceptible to this 
manipulation, so should be used whenever possible. 
This study adds to the literature on measuring situational awareness by providing 
evidence that supports the use of the QUASA technique, as participants who noticed hazards 
had significantly higher scores of objective situational awareness than their counterparts. 
With regards to the purpose of this study, not enough participants reacted to the hazards, so 
statistical analyses could not be undertaken to test the hypotheses. However, as mentioned 
above, a large proportion of participants did not react to the hazards even though they noticed 
them. This discrepancy with previous findings shows the important difference between 
objective data and self-report data. Additionally, simply attempting an experimental study to 
examine peoples’ reactions to safety hazards has added to safety literature, as no known 
studies have attempted this before. All known previous studies have used surveys to attain the 
relevant data, which can easily be fraught with self-report biases. As such, important lessons 
can be learnt from this study for future safety research, each of which are considered below. 
Strengths and Limitations 
The current study had three main limitations: potential issues with internal validity, 
threats to the generalisability of the results, and the small number of hazards used. Firstly, 
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this study has a few potential issues with internal validity. In particular, several participants 
seem to have undertaken hypothesis guessing by expecting some sort of distraction and 
ignoring everything in the room except for the task at hand. By ignoring their environment, 
the majority of these participants failed to notice any hazards, potentially skewing the results. 
Additionally, seven of these participants noticed the sparking fan heater, but failed to react to 
it as they believed it was simply a distraction from the task and did not consider it to be 
dangerous until they thought about it during the second session. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to prevent participants from hypothesis-guessing and altering their reactions to 
situations (Cook & Campbell, 1979). However, by hiding the true purpose of the study until 
after completing the office task, it was possible to prevent participants from responding to 
hazards in ways that the researchers expected. While this resulted in some participants 
purposefully ignoring their surroundings to avoid being distracted, it prevented a large 
proportion of participants from actively altering their reactions to hazards, meaning that the 
results of the study could be more valid, but are more useful than if participants had known 
the purpose of the study beforehand. 
A second concern is the limited generalisability of the results across different 
environments. While this experiment has high levels of ecological validity, it is not 
particularly generalisable to non-office workplaces. Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
address this issue in the design of the experiment, other than undertaking several experiments 
across multiple settings, such as in a workshop or at a construction site. While this would 
have resulted in a large amount of useful safety data for multiple environments, it would have 
required a much longer time period for data collection and multiple appropriate samples. 
While it was not possible to undertake such an endeavour within the given time-frame, future 
research could attempt a similar experiment in different settings, such as a workshop 
environment or a construction site. 
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A final concern is the small number of hazards used in the experiment. In reality, there 
are hundreds of potential safety hazards that can be present in a workplace. However, the six 
hazards used in this study were utilised because they are common office hazards. More 
hazards could have been included, but given the size of the office space, it was determined 
that more than three hazards per condition would have resulted in the room being somewhat 
crowded with hazards. This would in turn affect the validity of the study, as participants 
would be more likely to notice a hazard and therefore react to any that they noticed. 
Therefore, even though the number of hazards utilised was very limited, it was appropriate 
for the experimental environment to avoid over-exposing participants to hazards. 
The current study has several strengths. Firstly, the experimental design with a controlled 
environment allowed us to determine how people react to hazards, rather than relying on self-
reports based on hypothetical situations. Secondly, the high level of control over lab settings 
means that the study is easy for future researchers to replicate. Third, participants did not 
know that the experiment was about their reactions to safety hazards until after they had 
started the second session, which prevented pro-social behaviour biases. As such, there is no 
reason to believe that the people in this sample would act differently to hazards in a real-life 
office setting for any social reason. 
Additionally, the experimental environment was an ecologically valid representation of a 
typical office space, meaning the results are probably generalizable to other office 
environments. Also, a student sample was used as students often work part-time, and are 
accustomed to office environments, so it was determined that a student sample was more 
appropriate than a random sample, which could include individuals from high-risk industries 
who may not consider office hazards to be dangerous. Therefore, these findings are likely to 
be relevant for most office settings, as the sample was appropriate for the environment, and 
the experimental environment was a regular office, which provides ecological validity. 
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Lastly, the use of the QUASA method allowed for a complete view of participants’ 
situational awareness. Other measures, such as the SART or PSAQ rely solely on 
participants’ self-ratings, which are very vulnerable to biases and manipulation (Matthews, 
Pleban, Endsley, & Strater, 2000; Taylor, 1990). Alternatively, Endsley’s SAGAT method 
utilises a multiple-choice format to objectively measure situational awareness (Endsley, 
1988). The QUASA technique combines both self-ratings and an objective measure of 
situational awareness to give a view of the individual’s actual situational awareness and their 
perceived situational awareness. This allows for a more complete measure of individuals’ 
situational awareness compared to other methods. 
In conclusion, the current study examined the differences in report-rate and neutralising 
behaviours exhibited in response to high-risk and low-risk safety hazards. It is very clear 
from the data that self-report biases could be present in previous research, as a large 
proportion of participants who noticed hazards did not voice their concerns or neutralise the 
hazards. Also, additional analyses examining differences between situational awareness 
replicated the results of previous studies, while safety consciousness findings can be 
explained by participants overcompensating for not noticing hazards. This study contributed 
to the growing literature on individuals’ reactions to differing levels of safety hazards by 
utilising an experimental design rather than relying on self-report data. The main limitation of 
the study is that the experimental findings are only relevant for an office context; further 
research is required to determine if these findings are consistent across multiple workplace 
settings. Overall, health and safety is an important field of study, as many workplace safety 
incidents occur each day. Therefore, it is paramount to explore causes and solutions to these 
problems and provide valuable information to organisations to reduce the number of 
workplace safety incidents that occur. 
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Appendix A 
Figure 3. 
An extension cord as a “trip hazard” 
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Figure 4. 
A broken photo frame and the front “glass” as a “cut/laceration hazard” 
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Figure 5. 
A chemical container as a “falling hazard” 
 
 
Figure 6. 
A top-down view of the mechanism preventing the jar from falling 
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Figure 7. 
A water spillage next to a multi-board – a potential “fire hazard” 
 
Figure 8. 
A desk lamp with exposed wires – a potential “fire/electrocution hazard” 
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Figure 9. 
A close-up view of the exposed wires on the desk lamp 
 
Figure 10. 
A sparking fan heater as a potential fire hazard 
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Appendix B 
Room layout diagram for minor hazards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Desk with an out-tray, radio clock, 
electric jug (plugged into a multi-
board), and mug.  
Experimenter sat here during 
the experiment. 
Photo frame placed 
upright in a bin with 
pieces of broken glass 
nearby 
This door remained closed 
and locked for the duration 
of the experiment. 
Sink. 
Filing cabinet with 
2 phone directories 
on top. Participants sat here during 
the experiment. 
Bookcase with a pivoted 
chemical jar (and 
several jars glued in 
place) on the top shelf. 
Participants sat here while 
being instructed and 
debriefed. 
Extension 
cord set up 
as a trip 
hazard. 
Filing cabinets. 
Spare chairs 
and a table. 
Potted 
plant. 
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Room layout diagram for high-risk hazards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Desk lamp with 
exposed wires. 
This door remained closed 
and locked for the duration 
of the experiment. 
Sink. 
Desk with an out-tray, radio clock, 
electric jug (plugged into a multi-
board), and mug. Note the added 
puddle of water next to the multi-
board. 
Experimenter sat here during 
the experiment. 
Filing cabinet with 
2 phone directories 
on top. 
Potted 
plant. 
Participants sat here during 
the experiment. 
Bookcase. 
Participants sat here while 
being instructed and 
debriefed. 
Filing cabinets. 
Spare chairs 
and a table. 
Sparking 
fan heater. 
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Appendix C 
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Appendix D
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Appendix E 
 
Introductory Questions and Follow-up Questionnaire 
Participant Number: _____________________________________  
 
Gender: 
 Male 
 Female 
How old are you? _______________________________________  
Do you currently have a job? 
 No 
 Yes 
 Is it part-time 
 Full-time 
 Or casual 
 
__________________________________________________________________________  
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This is the start of the questionnaire 
1. Did you notice any safety hazards in the room during the experiment? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
If you answered No to the previous question, skip to Question 3 
2.  In this section please describe each hazard that you noticed in the room during the 
experiment, what you did (you can select multiple options), and if you did nothing, please 
indicate why you did nothing: 
Hazard Description 1:  _____________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________   
 
What did you do? 
 Told the experimenter 
 Told someone else after I left the experiment 
 Fixed the hazard 
 Attempted to make the hazard safe 
 Made sure I did not interact with the hazard (avoided it) 
 Nothing (If you did nothing, please indicate why? Tick as many boxes as 
apply: 
 I felt that the hazard was inconsequential 
 I felt that reporting it would not lead to it being fixed 
 I felt that fixing the hazard would be too difficult 
 I could not see a way to make the hazard safe 
 I felt that attempting to fix the hazard would endanger myself 
 I did not want to offend the researcher by mentioning it 
 I did not want to prolong the experiment 
 I was too shy to do or say anything 
 Other (please specify):  ______________________________________  
 _________________________________________________________  
 
In hindsight what should you have done? 
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________   
 _______________________________________________________________________   
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Hazard Description 2:  _____________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________   
 
What did you do? 
 Told the experimenter 
 Told someone else after I left the experiment 
 Fixed the hazard 
 Attempted to make the hazard safe 
 Made sure I did not interact with the hazard (avoided it) 
 Nothing (If you did nothing, please indicate why? Tick as many boxes as 
apply: 
 I felt that the hazard was inconsequential 
 I felt that reporting it would not lead to it being fixed 
 I felt that fixing the hazard would be too difficult 
 I could not see a way to make the hazard safe 
 I felt that attempting to fix the hazard would endanger myself 
 I did not want to offend the researcher by mentioning it 
 I did not want to prolong the experiment 
 I was too shy to do or say anything 
 Other (please specify):  ______________________________________  
 _________________________________________________________  
 
In hindsight what should you have done? 
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________   
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
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Hazard Description 3:  _____________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________   
 
What did you do? 
 Told the experimenter 
 Told someone else after I left the experiment 
 Fixed the hazard 
 Attempted to make the hazard safe 
 Made sure I did not interact with the hazard (avoided it) 
 Nothing (If you did nothing, please indicate why? Tick as many boxes as 
apply: 
 I felt that the hazard was inconsequential 
 I felt that reporting it would not lead to it being fixed 
 I felt that fixing the hazard would be too difficult 
 I could not see a way to make the hazard safe 
 I felt that attempting to fix the hazard would endanger myself 
 I did not want to offend the researcher by mentioning it 
 I did not want to prolong the experiment 
 I was too shy to do or say anything 
 Other (please specify):  ______________________________________  
 _________________________________________________________  
 
In hindsight what should you have done? 
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________   
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
  
66 
 
 
Hazard Description 4:  _____________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________   
 
What did you do? 
 Told the experimenter 
 Told someone else after I left the experiment 
 Fixed the hazard 
 Attempted to make the hazard safe 
 Made sure I did not interact with the hazard (avoided it) 
 Nothing (If you did nothing, please indicate why? Tick as many boxes as 
apply: 
 I felt that the hazard was inconsequential 
 I felt that reporting it would not lead to it being fixed 
 I felt that fixing the hazard would be too difficult 
 I could not see a way to make the hazard safe 
 I felt that attempting to fix the hazard would endanger myself 
 I did not want to offend the researcher by mentioning it 
 I did not want to prolong the experiment 
 I was too shy to do or say anything 
 Other (please specify):  ______________________________________  
 _________________________________________________________  
 
In hindsight what should you have done? 
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________   
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Hazard Description 5:  _____________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________   
 
What did you do? 
 Told the experimenter 
 Told someone else after I left the experiment 
 Fixed the hazard 
 Attempted to make the hazard safe 
 Made sure I did not interact with the hazard (avoided it) 
 Nothing (If you did nothing, please indicate why? Tick as many boxes as 
apply: 
 I felt that the hazard was inconsequential 
 I felt that reporting it would not lead to it being fixed 
 I felt that fixing the hazard would be too difficult 
 I could not see a way to make the hazard safe 
 I felt that attempting to fix the hazard would endanger myself 
 I did not want to offend the researcher by mentioning it 
 I did not want to prolong the experiment 
 I was too shy to do or say anything 
 Other (please specify):  ______________________________________  
 _________________________________________________________  
 
In hindsight what should you have done? 
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 _______________________________________________________________________   
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3. Does your current job have a safety component? (E.g. could you be hurt doing this job?) 
 Yes 
 No 
 
4. For each of the three accident and incidents categories please indicate how many you have been 
involved with over your entire life 
  
 Number of times 
Near miss incidents, which had it turned out differently, could have 
resulted in injury or damage 
 
Minor injuries requiring medical attention (e.g. first aid treatment or 
a visit to a doctor) 
 
Lost Time Injury (LTI) that has required you to take time off 
school/university/work 
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5. These statements are about your safety behaviour. For each statement, please circle the 
number which indicates the extent to which you disagree or agree.  
  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree/ 
disagree 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
agree 
I always take extra time to do things 
safely 
1 2 3 4 5 
People think of me as being an 
extremely safety-minded person 
1 2 3 4 5 
I always avoid dangerous situations 1 2 3 4 5 
I take a lot of time to do something 
safely even when it slows my 
performance 
1 2 3 4 5 
I often find myself making sure that 
other people do things that are safe and 
healthy 
1 2 3 4 5 
I get upset when I see other people 
acting dangerously 
1 2 3 4 5 
Doing the safest possible thing is always 
the best thing 
1 2 3 4 5 
I would rather take risks than be overly 
cautious 
1 2 3 4 5 
In the past month I have done some 
exciting things that other people might 
think are dangerous 
1 2 3 4 5 
I love to take risks even when there is a 
small chance I could get hurt 
1 2 3 4 5 
Sometimes people get on my nerves 
when they tell me how to act “more 
safely” 
1 2 3 4 5 
I value fun more than being safe 1 2 3 4 5 
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6. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether it is true or false and provide 
a rating of how confident you are that your answer is correct. Note: when the experiment 
room is mentioned, it refers to the room where you completed the task, NOT including the 
room where you were greeted. 
Statement Assessment Confidence 
a) There were two (2) chairs in the experiment room.  True 
 False 
 Very high 
 High 
 Moderate 
 Low 
 Very low 
 
b) There were books on the bottom shelf of the bookcase 
in the experiment room. 
 True 
 False 
 Very high 
 High 
 Moderate 
 Low 
 Very low 
 
c) There is carpet on the floor in the experiment room.  True 
 False 
 Very high 
 High 
 Moderate 
 Low 
 Very low 
 
d) There were chemical jars in the experiment room.  True 
 False 
 Very high 
 High 
 Moderate 
 Low 
 Very low 
 
e) There was a candle in the experiment room.  True 
 False 
 Very high 
 High 
 Moderate 
 Low 
 Very low 
 
f) There is a sink in the experiment room.  True 
 False 
 Very high 
 High 
 Moderate 
 Low 
 Very low 
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g) There is a clock in the experiment room.  True 
 False 
 Very high 
 High 
 Moderate 
 Low 
 Very low 
 
h) There are two (2) filing cabinets in the experiment 
room. 
 True 
 False 
 Very high 
 High 
 Moderate 
 Low 
 Very low 
 
i) There is a plant in the experiment room.  True 
 False 
 Very high 
 High 
 Moderate 
 Low 
 Very low 
 
j) There were two (2) phone books on top of a filing 
cabinet in the experiment room. 
 True 
 False 
 Very high 
 High 
 Moderate 
 Low 
 Very low 
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Appendix F 
 
An experimental evaluation of safety hazards in an office environment 
 
Experiment record 
Condition 1 (Low-Risk hazards) 
Participant Number:  __________________________  
Hazard Did they fix it? Did they report it? 
Falling Hazard (chemical container on high shelf) 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
Details: 
 
 
 
 
Extension cord as trip hazard 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
Details: 
 
 
 
 
Broken picture frame with glass on floor 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
Details: 
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An experimental evaluation of safety hazards in an office environment  
 
Experiment record 
Condition 2 (High-Risk hazards) 
Participant Number:  __________________________  
Hazard Did they fix it? Did they report it? 
Desk lamp with exposed wiring 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
Details: 
 
 
 
 
Sparking fan heater 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
Details: 
 
 
 
 
Multi-board next to water puddle 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
Details: 
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Appendix G 
 
Psychology Department 
Telephone: +64 (03) 364 2987 ext. 7187 
Email: adam.davies@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
14/5/2015 
 
Information retrieval: Common techniques used by undergraduate students 
Information Sheet for Participants 
 
My name is Adam Davies, and I am currently completing my dissertation for my Masters of Science majoring 
in Applied Psychology. The purpose of this research is to determine the methods that people use to find 
information online. To achieve this, participants will be asked to address 5 envelopes to high school career 
advisors from a random region of New Zealand. A brief survey will be administered after completion of the 
task to determine methods used by participants. 
 
Your involvement in this project will include the completion of the task described above, which will be set 
up to allow movement around the room. You will be required to find the shipping details (name and school 
address) of 5 high school career advisors and write these details on provided envelopes. Additionally, you 
must place the provided information booklets within each envelope and seal the envelope for postage. 
After completion of the task, a survey will be administered to gauge your reaction to the task and 
determine the information-seeking techniques that you utilized. Finally, a debrief will be completed to 
reiterate the purpose of the study, and provide you with a chance to withdraw from the study. Due to the 
nature of the study, the survey and debrief can only be administered 24-48 hours after completion of the 
task, so the entire experiment will be spread across two sessions. The first session should take 
approximately 10 to 15 minutes to complete, while the second session should take 10 to 15 minutes to 
complete. 
 
You may receive a copy of the project results by contacting the researcher at the conclusion of the project. 
Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any stage without penalty. If you withdraw, I 
will remove information relating to you; however this will be impossible after October 2, 2015. 
 
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete confidentiality of data 
gathered in this investigation: your identity will not be made public without your prior consent. To ensure 
anonymity and confidentiality, data will only be examined as a whole sample, not on the individual level. To 
allow for individual data removal, individual questionnaire data will be linked to individuals using a random 
number generator to allow for data deletion if any participants wish to be removed from the sample. Only 
the research team will have access to the data, as it will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in a locked 
room, and electronic data will be password-protected on password-protected computers. All data will 
be destroyed after five years. A thesis is a public document and will be available through the UC Library. 
 
The project is being carried out as a requirement for a Master’s of Science in Applied Psychology by Adam 
Davies under the supervision of Associate Professor Chris Burt, who can be contacted at 
christopher.burt@canterbury.ac.nz. He will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about 
participation in the project. 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, and 
participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of 
Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
 
If you agree to participate in the study, you are asked to complete the consent form and return it to Adam 
at Room 607 in the Psychology Staff Block or at the end of your debrief.  
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Psychology Department 
Telephone: +64 (03) 364 2987 ext. 7187 
Email: adam.davies@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
Information retrieval: Common techniques used by undergraduate 
students 
Consent Form for Participants 
 
I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. 
 
I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time without penalty. 
Withdrawal of participation will also include the withdrawal of any information I have provided 
should this remain practically achievable. 
 
I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher 
and his supervisor, Chris Burt, and that any published or reported results will not identify the 
participants.  I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the UC 
Library. 
 
I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities and in 
password protected electronic form and will be destroyed after five years. 
 
I understand the risks associated with taking part and how they will be managed. 
 
I understand that I am able to receive a report on the findings of the study by contacting the 
researcher at the conclusion of the project. 
 
I understand that I can contact the researcher Adam Davies (adam.davies@pg.canterbury.ac.nz) or 
his supervisor Associate Professor Chris Burt (christopher.burt@canterbury.ac.nz) for further 
information.  If I have any complaints, I can contact the Chair of the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) 
 
By signing below, I agree to participate in this research project. 
 
Name: _________________________________________________________________  
 
Signature: ______________________________________________________________  
 
Date: __________________________________________________________________  
 
This form should be returned at the end of the experiment debrief or at the earliest opportunity 
afterwards. If this is not possible, it can be dropped off at Room 607in the Psychology Staff Block 
to Adam before October 9, 2015. 
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UC PSYC105/106 research participation debrief 
An experimental evaluation of how people react to differing 
levels of safety hazards in an office environment   
 
The idea of this study is to determine why people do not inform others of safety hazards. 
This study attempts to answer this by putting people in a room that has three safety 
hazards. The safety hazards will all fall into the same category, depending on the condition: 
low-risk or high-risk. Each of the hazards are faked so that participants will not be harmed. 
Participants can react to the hazards in three possible ways: they can attempt to fix a 
hazard, report a hazard, or do nothing. The survey which is completed after the task aims to 
determine why individuals may have done nothing. For example, it is possible that they did 
not notice the hazards; it is impossible to react to something that you have not noticed. It 
will be recorded whether or not participants report or fix hazards, and the survey data will 
be used to check for common reasons for participants doing nothing. 
It is predicted that individuals will be more likely to fix low-risk hazards than high-risk 
hazards. However, it is also predicted that individuals will be less likely to report low-risk 
hazards than high-risk hazards. The hypotheses are presented below in an equation form: 
𝐻1 =  𝐹𝐿𝑅 >  𝐹𝐻𝑅 
Where F is the fix-rate of hazards 
𝐻2 =  𝑅𝐿𝑅 <  𝑅𝐻𝑅 
Where R is the report-rate of hazards 
This information can be used by organisations that have high levels of workplace 
incidents or injuries, as it can help to provide employers with possible reasons for 
employees not reporting workplace hazards. This will allow employers to address reporting 
issues and promote a strong culture of hazard-reporting, which will reduce the amount of 
workplace injuries and deaths. This outcome is extremely important, as each day 960,000 
people around the world are injured in their workplace. 
Due to the design of the study, it is imperative that the true purpose of the study remain 
secret until the data collection phase is complete. If participants knew beforehand the 
purpose of the study, it is highly likely that they would react in socially desirable ways, 
therefore confounding the results of the study. 
 
 
 
